We present a cryptographically sound formal method for proving correctness of key exchange protocols. Our main tool is a fragment of a symbolic protocol logic. We demonstrate that proofs of key agreement and key secrecy in this logic imply simulatability in Shoup's secure multi-party framework for key exchange. As part of the logic, we present cryptographically sound abstractions of CMA-secure digital signatures and a restricted form of DiffieHellman exponentiation, which is a technical result of independent interest. We illustrate our method by constructing a proof of security for a simple authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol.
INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic protocols are the fundamental building blocks of secure communication systems. Key exchange protocols, in particular, are commonly used to implement secure sessions. Secure session establishment is the main objective of widely deployed protocols such as Kerberos [29] , SSL/TLS [21] and IKE [28] . Therefore, ensuring correctness and security of key exchange is of critical importance. Intuitively, a key exchange protocol is secure if it provides agreement (upon completion of the protocol, the parties correctly know each other's identity and agree on the value of the established key) and key secrecy (for anyone but the participants, the established key is indistinguishable from a random value).
Design and analysis of provably correct key exchange protocols has a long history [8, 22, 7, 9, 6, 34, 15, 16] . Cryptographic proofs of security for key exchange are usually carried out in the so-called simulatability paradigm (e.g., [5, 10] ), using standard techniques Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. for secure multi-party computation [24] . Informally, this involves defining an ideal functionality for key exchange which is secure by design because, in the ideal functionality, a trusted third party generates the key as a true random value and distributes it to protocol participants. The actual, real-world protocol is secure if there exists an efficient (i.e., probabilistic polynomial-time) simulator, that, with access only to the ideal functionality, can "fool" any efficient adversary into thinking that the latter is engaged in the real-world protocol. If the ideal-world simulation and the real-world protocol are indistinguishable, then no more information can be extracted from real-world protocol sessions than from the ideal functionality. Since the latter is secure by design, security of the real-world protocol follows. Simulatability-based definitions are appealing because they provide a natural way of specifying the abstraction (i.e., the ideal functionality) that the key exchange protocol is supposed to present to higher-level applications.
Constructing proofs of simulatability is, in general, a nontrivial task. Validity arguments for the simulator often rely on manual case analysis and informal reasoning "by the logic of the protocol" (e.g., [34] ). We show that, for a certain class of key exchange protocols, the simulator can be constructed automatically. Validity of the simulator is then proved using a simple, purely symbolic deductive system which does not involve probabilities. Such symbolic inference systems for reasoning about security are known in the literature as "Dolev-Yao" models.
We use a fragment of the protocol composition logic of Durgin, Datta et al. [23, 19] , containing abstract digital signatures, but not encryption. We also introduce a formal abstraction of a particular usage of Diffie-Hellman exponentiation, namely, derivation of a shared key from authenticated Diffie-Hellman values. We prove that this fragment is "computationally" sound: even though the logic represents cryptographic primitives as abstract symbolic terms, the existence of a symbolic proof implies security in the standard cryptographic model.
Our second contribution is symbolic, computationally sound criteria for proving security of key exchange protocols in Shoup's simulatability-based framework [34] with static corruptions. Our approach thus combines the ease of reasoning (and possible automation) provided by purely symbolic deductive techniques with the strong security guarantees implied by simulatability. We illustrate our approach by constructing a proof of security for an authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol.
Our choice of Shoup's framework is somewhat arbitrary. We were attracted by its conceptual simplicity, which allowed us to carry out symbolic reasoning solely on the basis of standard assumptions about the underlying cryptography, namely, the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption and security of the digital sig-nature scheme against existential forgery. Shoup's model does not separate authentication from key exchange, thus avoiding the need for hybrid ideal functionalities, nor does it require the use of any specific cryptographic library. We believe that the techniques developed in this paper can be applied to other simulatability-based frameworks for key exchange.
Related work. The protocol composition logic used in this paper is due to Durgin, Datta et al. [23, 19] . Computational soundness for a different, complementary fragment of this logic (containing encryption, but not signatures) is established in [20] . Our techniques are similar, but (i) we extend the logic with axioms modeling the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption and the use of universal hash functions for randomness extraction from joint Diffie-Hellman values, (ii) our cryptographic definitions of security are simulatabilitybased, and thus substantially different from the game-based definitions considered in [20] .
Bridging the gap between symbolic models and the computational model used in modern cryptography has been a subject of very active research [1, 31, 30, 32] . Our proof techniques are inspired by the work of Micciancio and Warinschi [32] . The results of [31, 32] , however, simply show the existence of a sound symbolic abstraction for protocol traces in the presence of CCA2-secure encryption, and cannot be used to demonstrate simulatability of Diffie-Hellman-based protocols.
Canetti et al. [11, 12, 16, 17, 13] and Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner [33, 3, 4] proposed simulatability-based definitions of security for cryptographic primitives and protocols that are preserved under arbitrary or universal composition (UC). We view our work as complementary. Instead of alternative definitions, we propose cryptographically sound symbolic methods for proving that a protocol is simulatable in a particular ideal functionality.
Another important difference is that symbolic proofs can rely on UC cryptographic primitives only if the primitives' ideal functionalities are purely "Dolev-Yao." Informally, this means that every computation using a given cryptographic primitive must have a sound symbolic abstraction, as is the case, e.g., for the "universally composable cryptographic library" [3] . By contrast, we follow [20] in requiring only that every provable symbolic theorem hold for the overwhelming majority of computational instantiations. For a class of key establishment protocols based on authenticated DiffieHellman, this enables us to obtain computationally sound symbolic proofs without coming up with a general-purpose "DolevYao" functionality for Diffie-Hellman exponentiation (which is a challenging open problem).
Limitations of our approach are as follows. We only consider a small class of protocols, in which Diffie-Hellman exponentiation is used solely for key derivation. If our symbolic criteria cannot be proved for a particular protocol, this does not mean that the corresponding computational criteria do not hold (unlike UC definitions, our criteria do not provide an exact characterization). This is inevitable in any expressive deductive system. Finally, in our model, the adversary is not allowed to corrupt participants in the middle of protocol execution. Therefore, symbolically proved simulatability is not necessarily preserved under arbitrary composition. This is the price we pay for extending computational soundness results to cryptographic primitives such as Diffie-Hellman with standard (non-UC) definitions of security. In the future, we plan to investigate symbolic proof methods for stronger notions of composability, such as security in the presence of adaptive corruptions.
Canetti and Herzog proposed a symbolic criterion for universally composable key exchange [14] , while Backes and Pfitzmann [2] proposed an alternative symbolic criterion for key secrecy. Both papers consider classes of protocols which are substantially different from ours, with cryptographic primitives that include encryption, but not Diffie-Hellman. We view this paper, along with [20] , as one of the first steps towards development of cryptographically sound proof methods for criteria such as those proposed in [14, 2] .
We are not aware of other computational soundness results for protocols using Diffie-Hellman. A computational soundness result for symbolic digital signatures appears in [18] . Although [18] claims to rely on standard CMA security [25] , the reduction in [18, p. 21 ] makes a stronger assumption that the adversary cannot compute a valid signature which had not been previously produced by an honest party. By contrast, our model for digital signatures only assumes CMA security, and thus permits the adversary to forge new signatures on plaintexts which had been previously signed by a honest party.
Organization of the paper. We explain the cryptographic assumptions in section 2, then define the symbolic protocol model in section 3, and the computational model in section 4. In section 5, we give the fragment of the protocol composition logic of Durgin, Datta et al. that we are using in this paper, and the associated inference system in section 6. Section 7 contains the main result of the paper: automated construction of the simulator and symbolic proof of validity, illustrated by the example in section 8. We describe future research directions in section 9.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND
Our cryptographic definitions are standard. We discuss them in more detail in the full version of this paper [26] .
A digital signature scheme consists of a key generation algorithm K which produces a public/private key pair, a signing algorithm S, and a verification algorithm V. The signature scheme is assumed to be secure against existential forgery under the adaptive chosenmessage attack [25] . Informally, this means that is computationally infeasible for the adversary to produce a signature on any message which had not been previously signed by an honest signer.
We formalize the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption as a game. Let G be a group of large prime order q and let g ∈ G be a generator. Let O DH denote a "Diffie-Hellman oracle." In the learning phase, the adversary can make a polynomial number of distinct queries of the form (i, j) (i = j). In response to a query, the oracle returns the (g
, where xi, xj are chosen uniformly at random from Zq. In the testing phase, the adversary makes a single query of the form (i, j) (i = j), where (i, j) is different from any pair used in the learning phase. A random bit b is chosen by the oracle. If b = 0, then the tuple (g
is returned, where zij is random. The DDH assumption says that no efficient adversary can compute b with probability that is greater than 1 2 by more than a negligible amount. Finally, let H be an almost universal family of hash functions mapping {0, 1} n to {0, 1} l and indexed by a set I, i.e., for every x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , x = y, the probability that hi(x) = hi(y) for an element hi ∈ H selected uniformly from H is at most
The leftover hash lemma [27] states that the distribution {hi(x)} is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution for a uniformly random hash function index i.
Definition of security for key exchange. We adopt Shoup's model of secure key exchange [34] due to its conceptual simplicity. It is specific to key exchange, unlike general-purpose models, such as universal composability [12, 16] and reactive simulatability [4] , that aim to give new definitions for cryptographic primitives and multi-party protocols which are preserved under general composition. It also allows us to demonstrate the power of symbolic reasoning directly, and to avoid the difficulties inherent in coming up with a universally composable model of Diffie-Hellman exponentiation.
Shoup's framework is based on the standard notion of multiparty simulatability. Here we give a concise summary of [34] . A more detailed exposition can be found in the full version of this paper [26] . For simplicity, we consider the case of two-party protocols. First, an ideal-world model is defined, in which key exchange is carried out with the help of a trusted third party, called the ring master in [34] , but perhaps better referred to as the ideal key exchange functionality. In the ideal world, the adversary may instruct the ideal functionality to create a truly random key ("create" operation), chosen by the ideal key exchange functionality, and to securely distribute the created key to both user instances ("connect" operation). Clearly, this ideal-world key exchange is secure by definition, since the key is a random value which is known to both user instances but hidden from the adversary. In this paper, we limit our attention to static corruptions, and only permit the ideal-world adversary to compromise user instances that are engaged in a protocol session with a corrupt user.
In the real-world model, there is no trusted third party and keys are established by executing the actual key exchange protocol. For both the real-world and ideal-world adversaries, a transcript is created, recording all observable events as they happen.
A key exchange protocol is correct in this framework if it has the properties of termination, liveness, and simulatability. Termination requires that any real-world user instance terminate after a polynomially bounded number of messages are delivered to it. Liveness requires that, for every efficient real world-adversary A, whenever the adversary faithfully delivers all messages between the two user instances, both user instances successfully terminate the protocol and generate a session key. Simulatability requires that, for every real-world adversary A, there exists an ideal-world simulator S such that their transcripts, RealWorld(A) and IdealWorld(S), respectively, are computationally indistinguishable.
SYMBOLIC MODEL
Our symbolic protocol model is essentially the same as in the protocol composition logic of Datta et al. [19] . Therefore, we only give the main definitions and indicate where our model differs from [19] . Informally, protocol Π is a set of roles, each describing a sequence of actions to be executed by a participant in a protocol session. A role can be thought of as a strand in the Strand Space Model [35] . In this paper, we focus on two-party protocols.
Protocol syntax is given in fig. 1 . Note that terms representing signatures have labels r, which are used to differentiate between different signatures on the same plaintext. (Recall that CMA security does not guarantee uniqueness of signatures, and permits the adversary to forge new signatures on plaintexts previously signed by honest participants). The term d(x, y) denotes Diffie-Hellman exponentiation g x.y for some base g (generator of some large cyclic group G under multiplication). Note that d(x, y) is same as d(y, x) since multiplication is commutative. We abuse notation and refer to both terms by d(x, y). We also use the same symbol ν for (syntactically different) generation of new random nonces (νx) and generation of new indices (νi) for the universal family of hash functions.
To simplify the logic for the purposes of this paper, we omit encryption. Internal terms are used in the internal computations of protocol participants and include, in addition to normal terms, hash functions. Participants are not allowed to send terms containing hash functions as part of protocol messages (but they are crucial in proving secrecy of the derived key).
Actions include special annotations (create) and (connect), which mark, respectively, the point in the protocol where, according to the specification, the key is first computed by an honest par- A symbolic trace of protocol Π is a sequence of steps denoting, in the order of execution, all honest participants' actions and send/receive actions of the attacker. Formally, this is modeled as a symbolic execution strand ExecStrandΠ ::= Start(Init), AList, where Init is some initial configuration, and AList is the sequence of actions. The adversarial view of a symbolic trace is a projection which lists, in the order of execution, send and receive actions. For a symbolic trace ts ∈ ExecStrandΠ, let Adv η (Π,A) (ts) (or simply Adv(ts)) denote the corresponding adversarial view.
COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
To link the abstract symbolic model described in section 3 to the full computational model, in which cryptographic primitives are implemented as actual computational algorithms, we (i) instantiate the abstract actions of honest protocol participants to computational actions and the abstract symbolic terms sent by honest participants to corresponding bitstrings, and (ii) construct symbolic abstractions for all messages generated by the computational adversary.
We emphasize that, unlike other work on computational soundness of symbolic models [32, 12, 3] , we do not claim that every computational trace has a sound symbolic abstraction (this is difficult to achieve in the presence of malleable Diffie-Hellman exponentiation). Our computational soundness is a weaker condition: any property that can be proved in the symbolic model using the logic of section 5 is guaranteed to hold in the computational model. This is the same general approach as in [20] , but the properties considered in this paper are substantially different. Weakening the soundness requirement allows us to handle key exchange protocols based on Diffie-Hellman.
As in [32, 20] , we fix the protocol Π, adversary A, security parameter η, and some randomness R of size polynomially bounded in η, which is divided into the randomness used by honest participants and that used by the adversary. The symbolic protocol execution is converted into a concrete execution by mapping every abstract symbol into the corresponding bitstring and instantiating every abstract action of the honest participants with the corresponding computational action.
Details of this mapping are given in the full version of this paper [26] .
x.y ∈ G where G belongs to a family of large cyclic groups (indexed by the security parameter η) of prime order q whose generator is g, and so on. Symbolic actions are instantiated similarly, e.g., (νx) is instantiated in the concrete model as generation of a random nonce using randomness R.
The only difficult part is defining a symbolic abstraction for messages sent by the adversary. As in [32] , this is done by parsing them and replacing every bitstring which is neither an instantiation of a symbolic constant, nor generated by an honest participant with a new symbol, denoting an adversarial nonce. We handle terms of the form g x as follows. Whenever an honest participant receives a value representing g x for some x which is known to the recipient, we abstract the corresponding term as d(x) (because the recipient can compute g x and check if it matches the received value). If x is not known, we create a new symbolic term d(x ′ ) where x ′ is a new symbolic name.
Informally, the resulting symbolic abstraction of Diffie-Hellman terms is not "Dolev-Yao." Because Diffie-Hellman exponents are malleable, the adversary can convert some g y sent by an honest participant into g y ′ , and this computation does not have a symbolic equivalent. Note, however, that our theorem 1 guarantees computational soundness only for properties that are provable in the symbolic logic. As we demonstrate below, a symbolic proof for agreement in a Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange protocol only goes through if the protocol ensures non-malleability (e.g., all DiffieHellman terms are signed), and for this class of protocols the symbolic abstraction is sound.
A computational trace tΠ,A(η, R) (for some fixed protocol Π, adversary A, security parameter η and randomness R) is defined as a tuple (ts, f , R), where ts ∈ ExecStrandΠ is the corresponding symbolic trace, f is the function from Var(ts) ∪ Const (where Var(ts) denotes the set of variables occurring in ts and Const is the set of symbolic constants) to bitstrings (of size polynomially bounded in η). We denote by CExecStrandΠ the set of all computational (concrete) traces of the protocol Π.
Given a concrete trace t, we denote by R(t) = (RA, RΠ) the randomness used in t. We say that a concrete trace tc is an implementation of ts (or inversely, ts is an abstraction of tc), denoted by tc = Exec (Adv(ts)) where tc = (ts, f , R(tc)).
PROTOCOL LOGIC
The syntax of the logic is given in fig. 2 , where ρ denotes a role (see fig. 1 ), while t and P denote a term and a thread, respectively. The only substantial addition to [19] is the IndistRand predicate. a ::= Send(P, m) | Receive(P, m) | New(P, t) | Verify(P, t) ϕ ::= a | Has(P, t) | Fresh(P, t)
Figure 2: Syntax of the protocol logic
In the rest of this paper, we use ϕ and ψ to indicate predicate formulas and m to denote a generic term called a "message." A message m is a 4-tuple (source, destination, session id, content). Since we model the network as controlled by the adversary, the source and destination fields may not denote the real identities of the principals and may be altered by the adversary at will.
Action formulas refer to honest participants' actions. For example, Send(P, m), Receive(P, m), New(P, t), Verify(P, t) mean that the last action taken in the protocol execution was, respectively, sending, receiving, generating a new value and verifying a signature by the agent P on message m. Formula Has(P, t) means that thread P knows term t, while Fresh(P, t) means that term t is freshly generated in thread P and has not been sent out in an outgoing message. Honest(P) means that party P is honest at the start of the protocol and remains honest throughout the execution of the protocol (we only consider static corruptions). Formula Contains(t1, t2) means that the term t2 is contained in the term t1. Formulas − 3 ϕ and − ϕ are temporal formulas which say, respectively, that ϕ was true sometime or immediately before in the past. Start(P) simply says that the P has not performed any actions in the past. Finally, the modal formula θ[R]Xϕ is in the style of Floyd-Hoare logic and states that in a thread X after actions R are executed, starting from a state in which the formula θ was true, formula ϕ is true in the resulting state.
For the purposes of this paper, the definition of the subterm relation ⊆ defined on terms coincides with the definition of closure, i.e., t1 ⊆ t2 iff t1 ∈ closure(t2), where the closure of term t is defined as the least set of terms derivable using the following rules:
t ∈ closure(t) t ∈ closure((t, s)), s ∈ closure((t, s)) t ∈ closure({t} l X ), d(x, y) ∈ closure(d(y, x)) r ∈ closure(s) ∧ s ∈ closure(t) ⇒ r ∈ closure(t) Symbolic semantics. Symbolic semantics is the same as previously published in [19] . We repeat it in the full version of this paper [26] . Formula ϕ is true in a symbolic trace R ∈ ExecStrandΠ of the protocol Π, denoted as Π,R |= ϕ or R(Π) |= ϕ, if ϕ holds true at the end of the trace R. Trace R may be a complete or an incomplete trace in which some of the parties have not completed the protocol. For a given protocol Π, let init(Π) denote the set of all possible initial configurations. Then Π satisfies ϕ, denoted by
Computational semantics. We now define what it means for a formula ϕ to hold over the set of concrete computational traces T of protocol Π. Our definitions follow closely those of [32, 20] . For all formulas not involving IndistRand, we define semantics on a single concrete trace. We say that a concrete execution trace t of a protocol Π satisfies a formula ϕ if ∃ ts ∈ ExecStrandΠ such that t = Exec η (Π,A) (ts) and ts satisfies ϕ, i.e., ϕ is true (in the symbolic semantics) on the symbolic abstraction of the concrete trace.
The semantics of a formula ϕ over a set of computational traces T is defined as the subset T ′ ⊆ T whose elements satisfy the formula ϕ. We say that a formula ϕ holds for protocol Π in the computational model, denoted by Π |=c ϕ, if the semantics of the formula ϕ is an overwhelming subset of all possible traces of the protocol Π. More precisely, given a formula ϕ and a protocol Π, we associate with ϕ the set [ϕ] η Π ⊆ CExecStrandΠ of traces in which the formula ϕ is satisfied. Now, Π |=c ϕ, if, by definition,
, where ν is some negligible function in the security parameter η.
Computational semantics for the IndistRand predicate is quite subtle because it cannot be defined for a single concrete trace. It can only be defined over families of traces (a similar issue arises when modeling real-or-random indistinguishability of values under encryption [20] ). Before we can define the computational semantics of IndistRand, we define a mapping Rand : it → it. Intuitively, Rand maps an internal term u to a "random" term Rand(u) that has the same structure. DEFINITION 1. Let Rand(u) denote a random term of the same structure as the (internal) term u. We define Rand(u) by induction over the term structure as follows (assuming that the renamed variables are unique up to α-renaming):
We now define the computational semantics of the IndistRand predicate. For a protocol Π, let ts ∈ ExecStrandΠ denote the symbolic trace according to the protocol specification and let tv = Adv(ts) be the corresponding adversarial view (recall that the adversarial view contains only observable actions). Let tv[t → u] denote a view in which every occurence of the (internal) term t is replaced by u. For a symbolic view tv and randomness R, let conc(tv) denote the corresponding computational view, i.e., conc(tv) = (tv, f , R), where f is the concretization function defined in section 4.
We say that protocol Π satisfies IndistRand(u) in the concrete model, denoted by Π |=c IndistRand(u), if two families (over randomness R) T, T ′ are computationally indistinguishable, where
For technical reasons, IndistRand needs to be defined over a family of computational traces. Instead, we define IndistRand over a family of computational views (recall that a view is a projection of a trace on observable actions), and say that IndistRand holds for a family of computational traces iff it holds over the corresponding family of computational views.
Let us now examine the definition. Intuitively, it says that the set of concrete instantiations of the symbolic view tv is computationally indistinguishable from the set of computational instantiations of the symbolic view t ′ v in which every subterm of u has been replaced by the corresponding random term. Note that in the proof system of section 6, IndistRand(u) appears only when the term u is the established key, or the joint Diffie-Hellman value from which the key is derived.
We emphasize that, when satisfied, this definition of indistinguishability guarantees that any (pptime-computable) usage of the established key is secure in the sense of simulatability (see section 2). In the proof of theorem 2, we use it to show that the adversary cannot distinguish between the transcript of the real-world 
where n ¶v a or a = m
where s ⊆ t Persist ∈ {Has, − 3 ϕ},
Figure 4: Preservation and freshness loss axioms
protocol, and the (simulated) ideal-world transcript in which all operations involving the key have been performed using a true random value instead. Even if one of the honest participants outputs the key in the clear after it has been established (note that the key is explicitly appended to the adversary's view of the protocol in our definition), the adversary has only a negligible probability of correctly telling the difference between the real world, where this leaked key is a pseudo-random number extracted from the joint Diffie-Hellman value, and the ideal world, where the leaked key had been generated as a true random number.
SYMBOLIC PROOF SYSTEM
Our proof system is based on the proof system in the original protocol logic of Datta et al. [23, 19, 20 ], but we omit the axioms for encryption and extend the logic with several new axioms: VER (signature verification axiom), DDH1 and DDH2 (Diffie-Hellman axioms), and LHL (leftover hash lemma, for reasoning about hash functions). We prove that the new axioms are computationally sound under standard cryptographic assumptions.
Our symbolic inference system is given in figs. 3-7. Say Π ⊢ ϕ if ϕ is provable using this system.
where t ⊆ t2 and X = Y Figure 5 : PLTL axioms and temporal ordering of actions 
THEOREM 1 (COMPUTATIONAL SOUNDNESS). Let Π be an executable protocol and ϕ a formula. If the protocol is implemented with a digital signature scheme which is secure against existential forgery under the adaptive chosen message attack and assuming the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds, then
The proof follows from computational soundness of all axioms and inference rules of the logic, which is proved in the full version of this paper [26] .
PROVING SIMULATABILITY
We now show how to automatically construct the simulator for Shoup's framework for key exchange [34] , and prove its validity using the purely symbolic logic described in sections 5 and 6. Since our main goal is establishing security of key exchange, we focus only on the simulatability requirement, and omit termination and liveness for the purposes of this paper.
We emphasize that the simulator and the computational proof of its validity are essentially the same as in Shoup's original paper [34] . The proofs in [34] , however, are hand-crafted and based on informal reasoning that "follows easily from the logic of the protocol" (see, e.g., [34, p. 25] ). Our contribution is to take a rigorously defined, computationally sound protocol logic and show that a simple symbolic proof in this logic implies the computational proof of [34] , thus opening the road to automated formal proofs of security for key exchange protocols.
Construction of the simulator
The complete algorithm for constructing the simulator in given in the full version of this paper [26] , and summarized here. As in [34] , the ideal-world simulator runs the real-world adversary A as a subroutine, simulating execution of real-world honest participants to him. The simulator computes the appropriate connection assignments (i.e., it figures out which ideal-world user instances to
where S(Π) denotes all possible starting configurations of Π and Alive(X) means that the thread X has not completed the protocol yet. connect based on which user instances are talking to each other in the real world), except that in the ideal world the ideal functionality substitutes computed real-world keys with random ideal-world keys. Whenever S compromises an ideal-world user instance, it does so by supplying the session key extracted from the real-world user instance that S is simulating to the real-world adversary A. Any record placed in the real-world transcript by the real-world adversary is copied by S to the ideal-world transcript. Finally, any application operation, which in Shoup's framework models arbitrary higher-level protocols or applications making use of the exchanged key, is evaluated in the real world using the computed real-world key, and in the ideal world using the random ideal-world key.
Validity of the simulator
To prove that the simulator S is valid, it is necessary to establish that the connection assignments made by S are legal and that the substitutions of real-world keys with random ideal-world keys are not detectable. We demonstrate that two symbolic conditions -one modeling agreement between the participants, the other modeling key secrecy -are sufficient for the computational validity of the simulator.
Agreement in the symbolic model. Following [7] , our definition is based on matching records of runs, which is slightly weaker than usual. The signature received by one party may be different from that sent by the other party, as long as it's on the same plaintext. For a symbolic trace R of a two-party protocol Π, a record of R by an honest party Ai (i ∈ [1, 2] Key secrecy in the symbolic model. To model key secrecy, we say that the key should be indistinguishable from a random number, i.e., we require that IndistRand(t) hold, where t is the symbolic term representing the key derived by the participants. More formally, let Real and Ideal denote the real-and ideal-world views, recording the interaction of the adversary with the honest participants and the simulator, respectively. In the ideal-world view, all occurences of the established key are replaced by a random number. Let RealKey and IdealKey denote the key in the real and ideal world, respectively. The adversary is given either (Ideal,IdealKey) or (Real,RealKey) depending on the value of a secret bit b (0 or 1). The adversary wins the game if he can correctly guess b with a probability non-negligibly greater than 1 2 . The main step of the proof of theorem 2 below involves showing that a distinguisher between the real-world and ideal-world transcripts in Shoup's framework can be used to win the above game. The validity argument rests on the following two conditions: (1) if two user instances share a key in the ideal world, then the corresponding real-world user instances must agree upon the same value for the key, (2) the keys generated in the ideal world and the real world are computationally indistinguishable. We shall refer to the first condition as key agreement and to the second condition as indistinguishability.
Suppose Π violates key agreement. By assumption, there exists a symbolic proof of agreement for Π in the logic. From the computational soundness of the logic (theorem 1), a proof of agreement in the symbolic model implies a proof of agreement in the concrete model. Hence, a contradiction.
We now consider the case when Π violates indistinguishability. We separate two cases: (1) both parties are honest, (2) one of the parties is (statically) corrupt. If both parties are honest, then the ideal-world key is a random value, and indistinguishability of the real-world key from a random value follows from the computational soundness of the proof of IndistRand(t). Now suppose one of the participants is corrupt. According to the construction of the simulator, the simulator S in this case simulates the other (honest) real-world participant to the real-world adversary. The simulator faithfully executes all actions of the honest participant according to the protocol specification and then extracts the generated key from this participant. He then uses the extracted key to "compromise" the ideal-world user instance corresponding to the honest real-world participant (intuitively, this is valid because in the real-world protocol, an honest participant who is talking to a corrupt participant will end up generating key which is known to the adversary). Thus, the key generated in the ideal world is exactly the same as in the real world. Hence, a contradiction.
To establish simulator validity, it remains to show that no adversary can tell the difference between the real-world transcript and the simulated ideal-world transcript except with a negligible probability. In addition to observable protocol actions, a transcript may contain records added via an application operation, which in Shoup's framework models any usage of the established key.
Suppose that IndistRand(t) holds, but there exists a distinguisher B between the real-and ideal-world transcripts. We obtain a contradiction by constructing another distinguisher A, which wins the IndistRand game (see section 5) with a non-negligible probability. Recall that in this game, A receives a pair consisting Init ::= { (A1 A2)[(νx). A1, A2, d(x) , {d(x), A2} of a view and a key, and must determine whether they come from a real-world or ideal-world protocol.
Since the view contains all observable actions, and the real-and ideal-world views are indistinguishable (because IndistRand(t) holds), the only additional information in the transcript which allows B to distinguish between the real and ideal worlds must be the presence of some application operation. An application operation is a polynomially computable function of the key. Therefore, all application operations can be efficiently computed by A, enabling it to use B as a resource to win the IndistRand game.
A runs a copy of B internally, applies the functions used in the application operations to the key he received as a challenge in the IndistRand game, creates a transcript, gives to B, and uses B's answer as his own answer in the IndistRand game. A's probability of winning the game is the same as B's probability of distinguishing real-and ideal-world transcripts. Hence, a contradiction.
EXAMPLE: DHKE PROTOCOL
We illustrate our method by proving security of the two-move authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol (DHKE). The symbolic specification of the protocol appears in fig. 8 .
Let A1 denote the initiator of the protocol and A2 the responder. Assume that the certificates for public signature verification keys are known and not sent as part of the protocol. Recall that create and connect are special markers denoting, respectively, the points in the protocol execution where the key is first derived by one (respectively, both) participants.
We prove agreement for the initiator role of the protocol. The proof for the responder is similar. The property is stated as pre [actions] post, where pre is the precondition before the actions in the actions list are executed and post is the postcondition. The actions in the formula are the actions of the Init role of the DHKE protocol. The precondition specifies that x is freshly generated by A1 before sending or receiving any messages. The postcondition captures the notion of agreement for the initiator role of the protocol (according to definition 2). The symbolic proof of this property is given in appendix A.
In fig. 9 , we give a symbolic proof of key secrecy (in the senseAPPENDIX A. PROOF OF AGREEMENT FOR DHKE PROTOCOL Fig. 10 contains the symbolic proof of agreement for the DHKE protocol.
